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THE NEW RUSSIAN LAW ON RELIGION:
A VIEW FROM THE REGIONS*
Michael Bourdeaux**
I. INTRODUCTION
The catastrophic experiment to forcibly impose "state atheism" (go-
sateizm) in the Soviet Union lasted just seventy years. Until Lenin's
first decree on the Separation of Church and State in January 1918,1
no government in history had sought to impose a system which re-
jected all forms of religion. The Roman Empire debased the gods of
mythology by decreeing that the ruler should be worshipped, but they
never abolished the pantheon. The French Revolution was strongly
anti-clerical, but Christian worship continued. "State atheism" had its
ups and downs for seventy years in Russia, but continued as the domi-
nant policy in one form or other until 1988. The advent of Mikhail
Sergeyevich Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party
put an end to anti-religious notions three years into his rule. The pre-
cise date was April 29, 1988, the day on which Gorbachev received a
group of leading bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in the
Kremlin. It was the first such meeting that had taken place since Sta-
lin received Metropolitan Sergi in September 1943 and only the sec-
ond in history. Gorbachev's words truly marked the beginning of a
new era.
Not everything has been easy and simple in the sphere of church-
state relations. Religious organisations were not free from being
affected by the tragic developments that occurred in the period of
the cult of personality. Mistakes made with regard to the church
and believers in the 1930s and the years that followed are being
rectified .... Believers are Soviet people, workers, patriots, and
they have the full right to express their convictions with dignity.
Perestroika, democratization and openness concern them as well-
in full measure and without any restrictions. This is especially true
* This essay was the basis of the 1999 Annual Lecture of the DePaul University Center for
Church/State Studies (April 29, 1999).
** Michael Bourdeaux was in the first group of British students to spend a year in Moscow
on a governmental scholarship (1959-1960). He has devoted his life to a study of religion in
Russia, founding the Keston Institute for this purpose. His latest book is PROSELYTISM AND
ORTHODOXY IN RussIA (Michael Bourdeaux & John Witte eds., 1999).
1. See G. P. FEDOTOV, THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE REVOLUTION (1928).
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of ethics and morals, a domain where universal norms and customs
are so helpful for our common cause.2
A communist leader had never before pronounced such a phrase as
''our common cause." Gorbachev proved to be as good as his word,
though of course his own experiment in democracy collapsed three
years later. Not only shortage of time prevented the emergence of
such a dialogue, but the churches suddenly became too strong to be
tempted in this direction. Gorbachev made two promises: the right to
celebrate the millennium of the baptism of Prince Vladimir in Kiev in
988 A.D. and the introduction of a new and just law on religion to
replace Stalin's of 1929.
The first was soon implemented, as plans were already in existence.
The celebration of the conversion of the Eastern Slavs (the ancient
land of 'Rus') was due to begin on June 4. But in the short time be-
tween Gorbachev's promises and that date, what might have been a
local celebration expanded to become one of international signifi-
cance. Guests from all over the world were expected, but they were
surprised to find that Russian television, radio, and newspapers would
lead every broadcast, and every issue, with extensive coverage of the
day's events. Moscow and Russia received the acclaim that should
rightly have belonged to Kiev and Ukraine, but nevertheless it felt as
though the USSR had become a Christian country overnight.3 The
apogee was a celebration in the Bolshoi Theatre where the massive
forces of the theatre itself joined with cathedral and seminary choirs in
a symphony of church and state, culminating in a massive peal of
church bells-real bells-which a panel rolled back to reveal above
the proscenium arch. In retrospect, some aspects of this week seem
over the top, but Russia would never be the same again.
Gorbachev's promise of a new law took longer to implement, but
when it was promulgated in September 1990, it went beyond every-
one's expectations in proclaiming total freedom of religion. 4 The 1990
version of the law even permitted the teaching of religion in the Rus-
sian Republic state schools although the text for the whole Soviet
Union did not go quite as far. Had this law remained in force for a
sensible period of time, it would have been a major step in the painful
evolution of Russia towards democracy. This is not the place to dis-
2. See MICHAEL BOURDEAUX, GORBACHEV, GLASNOST AND THE GOSPEL 44 (1990) [herein-
after GORBACHEV].
3. The author was an eye-witness to these events. Id. at 47-64.
4. See id. at 65-86. The full text and analysis surrounding this debate appears in Giovanni
Codevilla, Commentary on the New Soviet Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organi-
zations, 19 RELIGION IN COMMUNIST LANDS, 119-45 (1991).
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cuss the convoluted and secret processes which led to the abolition of
this law in September of 1997. However, its replacement was a
blueprint for the return of state control over religion, albeit of a differ-
ent kind from that formerly exercised by the Communist Party.
Under the old system, every region of the Soviet Union held its
local officials responsible for controlling religious activities and re-
porting back to the Council for Religious Affairs in Moscow. This
system was abolished in 1990, but not, as it proved, swept away.
Many, perhaps most, of these people remained at their desks or
moved to the local polytechnic to deliver lectures in favor of religion,
or at least in favor of the Orthodox Church. They were awaiting a
better day, when their services would once again be needed. That
time came with the 1997 law, for which they had joined in agitating
with the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church.
What had happened during the seven-year interim from 1990 to
1997 was basically a revival of all forms of native religion, coupled
with an invasion of cults from all over the world. Time might well
have dictated that the resulting dangers were more perceived than ac-
tual. 5 The reaction was entirely out of proportion, but the old atheist
guard believed that their day had come again. The resulting text was
achieved by a secretive process, and skulduggery does not seem too
strong a word in this context.
There is not space here to discuss the new law in detail and this has
already been done more than exhaustively elsewhere. 6 However, it is
worth pausing over the preamble-not, we are told by its Russian de-
fenders, part of the law itself, but merely the context in which the law
is set. This text, one convoluted sentence, would fail a test in logic
written by a high-school pupil.
Confirming the right of each to freedom of conscience and freedom
of creed, and also to equality before the law regardless of his atti-
tudes to religion and his convictions; basing itself on the fact that
the Russian Federation is a secular state; recognizing the special
contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the estab-
lishment and development of Russia's spirituality and culture . . . .7
So far so not very good, but just supportable: the juxtaposition of
"secular state" and "the special contribution of Orthodoxy" is bound
5. PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY, supra note **
6. See Symposium, Soul Wars: The Problem of Proselytism in Russia, 12 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 1 (1998). See also New Russian law puts religious freedom at threat, THE MONTH, July 1998,
at 255-61 (providing a succinct and telling summary).
7. For an exhaustive discussion of the 1997 law, see W. Cole Durham & Lauren B. Homer,
Russia's 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Ap-
praisal, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 101-246 (1998).
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to lead to misunderstandings somewhere along the line. A truly
astonishing phrase follows
[R]especting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other reli-
gions and creeds which constitute an inseparable part of the histori-
cal heritage of Russia's peoples; considering it important to
promote the achievement of mutual understanding, tolerance and
respect in questions of freedom of conscience and freedom of creed;
hereby adopts this federal law.8
So what is this "Christianity" which is separate from the Russian
Orthodox Church? We are not told. This, we must remind ourselves,
is part of the law of the land, not some casual commentary by a care-
less journalist. We can only assume that it means in fact Catholicism
and Protestantism, the first of which had a toehold on Russian soil,
the second rather more. Representatives of Islam, Buddhism and Ju-
daism were naturally delighted to find themselves named and pro-
tected under the new law. But what are the other "religions and
creeds which constitute an inseparable part of the historical heritage
of Russia's peoples?"
Confusion is already rife, but the main text will show that there are
three tiers of privilege. The Russian Orthodox Church, de facto, if not
de jure, encouraged by this special mention, will abrogate to itself in
the form of the local clergy the right of deciding, when appealed to by
the local state official, which other religions or denominations are to
be granted the right of registration. It apparently has first claim on
the loyalty of some 160 million people. Any other religion may be
considered "traditional" if it was in existence fifteen years before the
decree-1982-which takes one right back to the end of the Brezhnev
years. The extreme discrimination of those years is perpetuated to-
day. Any group not in existence before the decree must re-register
conditionally every year for the next fifteen years. This is to prove its
credentials and even though these groups have virtually no rights: no
printing and distribution of literature, owning property, hiring halls, or
inviting foreign guests. Those familiar with the period of "stagna-
tion" (zastoi), as Gorbachev called it, will know that this was a time of
widespread discrimination, with a ban on such groups as Methodists
(except in Estonia), Lutherans (except in Latvia and Estonia), some
groups of Baptists who had separated from the Moscow-dominated
All-Union Council, Byzantine Catholics (the "Uniates" or Greek
Catholics of Ukraine), Jehovah's Witnesses and many others. Some of
these groups had been notably present before the Revolution. For
example, Lutherans were in Siberia in the 17th century and in St. Pe-
8. See Symposium, supra note 6, at app.
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tersburg from its founding (see the magnificent church, now being re-
stored, on Nevsky Prospekt). The Anglican (Episcopal) Church had
owned property in St. Petersburg and Moscow, with flourishing con-
gregations before the Revolution. Subsequent abolition of their chap-
laincies would logically have meant that they fell foul of the "fifteen-
year rule," but of course for diplomatic reasons it would have been
inconceivable to take back in 1997 the church in Moscow where wor-
ship had vigorously resumed in 1991.
What are the "other religions and creeds which constitute an insep-
arable part of the historical heritage of Russia's peoples?" Such a
vague, indeed meaningless, phrase may not be susceptible to an obvi-
ous interpretation, but one surprising answer will suggest itself later in
this paper, when I come to discuss the rise of traditional paganism.
II. A PERSPECTIVE FROM HISTORY
Every Soviet leader put his personal stamp on atheist policy
(Lenin's seizure of church property, Stalin's purge of the whole church
leadership, moderation during World War II, Khrushchev's renewed
physical onslaught, Brezhnev's hunting down of the "dissidents"), but
the long-term aim of eliminating religion from the face of society con-
tinued to stand. Much of this policy was successful, if the word "face"
is taken literally. The effects of the devastation on the groups will
persist long into the 21st century, and may never be repaired. Every
church institution at local, diocesan, or national level was systemati-
cally destroyed. If churches of any denomination continued to exist
up to World War II, they were entirely isolated units and therefore all
the more vulnerable to persecution. There was no literature, no
teaching, no charitable work, and no communal activities outside the
four walls of a registered church. The number of the latter did indeed
grow following Stalin's concessions during the last decade of his life.
Some institutions re-emerged after the War, such as eight theological
seminaries and two academies, one heavily-censored journal, and a
politically-controlled central administration (the Moscow Patriarch-
ate). The Baptists-the only legal Protestant group-were accorded
some of these privileges, but without the theological education. The
Catholics had two churches and nothing else. Under Khrushchev all
these gains came under renewed threat, but his premature removal
from office halted the downward spiral, without allowing any restitu-
tion of recent losses. 9
9. For an account, partly based on eye-witness experiences of the Khrushchev period, see
MICHAEL BOURDEAUX, OPIUM OF THE PEOPLE 202-33 (1965).
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Beneath the surface, however, the elimination of religion had not
proceeded as smoothly, as the propagandists never tired of reporting
to the Soviet press. Indeed, there was something frenetic and despair-
ing in the tone of the constant assertions in the press that religion was
of course dying out, "but . . ." after the qualifying conjunction, the
reader would find diversified accounts illustrating the ways in which
survivals of religion persisted long after the destruction of the institu-
tions. In the process it was also revealed that the overlay of Ortho-
doxy, which spread throughout Siberia and the Russian south with the
expansion of the empire, was thin indeed and recent research provides
evidence of the most remarkable revival of pre-Christian religion.
What of the survival of Orthodoxy itself in the Russian heartland?
The evidence is manifold and widespread. But Boone illustrates it
better than Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The meager volume of his pub-
lished work is suffused with an underlying allegiance to the Christian
faith. Later, during the long period when his works were banned, he
revealed himself as an overt believer in Christianity. His first publica-
tion, the novella One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,10 an account
of life in a labor camp, which Khrushchev permitted to back up his
anti-Stalin campaign, gives a strong account of how prayer sustained
one of the inmates. His second and last published work in the Soviet
period, a collection of prose poems, contains a remarkable essay
which expresses horror at the desecration of Russia's precious Chris-
tian architectural heritage, publication of which inspired a new gener-
ation to try to do something to preserve the remaining tatters. An
excerpt gives the flavor.
When you travel the by-roads of Central Russia you begin to under-
stand the secret of the pacifying Russian countryside. It's in the
churches. They trip up the slopes, ascend the high hills, come down
to the broad rivers, like princesses in white and red, they lift their
bell-towers-graceful, shapely, all different-high over mundane tim-
ber and thatch, they nod to each other from afar, from villages that
are cut off and invisible to each other they soar to the same heaven
.... But when you get into the village you find that not the living
but the dead greeted you from afar. The crosses were knocked off
the roof or twisted out of place long ago. The dome has been
stripped and there are gaping holes between its rusty ribs .... Our
forefathers put all their understanding of life into these stones, into
these bell-towers. Ram it in, Vitka, give it a bash, don't be afraid!
Film-show at six, dancing at eight.11
10. ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH (1998).
11. MICHAEL BOURDEAUX, PATRIARCH AND PROPHETS: PERSECUTION OF RUSSIAN ORTHO-
DOX 154-55 (1969). The author then peers into the building and sees a youth club meeting. Id.
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III. RELIGIOUS REVIVAL
The revival of religion, especially among the intelligentsia of Mos-
cow and Leningrad as early as the 1960s is amply documented. 12
Those writers who have attributed it in some way to the perestroika of
Gorbachev are in serious error. What Gorbachev did was to take the
lid off a seething cauldron, facilitating the rebirth of religious institu-
tions nationwide and giving voice to the pent-up spiritual aspirations
of the Russian people [one meaning of glasnost]. This is the context in
which we must view the sudden events of 1988.
One major effect of all this, as well as releasing a wound-up spring,
was an influx of foreign missionaries of many denominations and reli-
gions. They were encouraged by the 1988, and 1990 legislation, and
especially by the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991. At this
time too, Russia, Ukraine, and other former constituent republics be-
gan to turn urgently to the West for advice and economic support,
which soon led to more access and a partial relaxation of visa restric-
tions. This was not to last. The new law on religion of 1997 was only
one aspect of the gathering spirit of resentment against the West in
Russia, underlined by the adoption of the new law by the Duma with
a majority of over 300 votes in favor.
However, if the main intention of the new law was to protect and
encourage Orthodoxy over all other religions (an interpretation based
on the first part of the Preamble), then it has signally failed. The revi-
val of all religions, those mentioned in the second part of the Pream-
ble and many others, is one of the most interesting, significant, but
least-known factors in the recent development of Russian society. It
deserves to be studied and documented, to be set alongside the end-
less accounts of economic deprivation in the countryside. A window
of opportunity has opened for the implementation of such work and it
is on the interim results of this as seen from the perspective of approx-
imately half way through a three-year study that this article is based.
In 1998, Keston Institute (Oxford, UK) secured a grant from the
Pew Charitable Trusts of Philadelphia to carry out a nationwide and
comprehensive survey of religious institutions in every region of Rus-
sia, leading to the establishment of a permanent database which can
be constantly revised. Never before in history could there have been
such an undertaking. In Tsarist Russia such ideas did not exist. In the
Soviet period there was no access for political and ideological reasons.
There is now a window of opportunity, which is not guaranteed to
12. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOURDEAUX, RISEN INDEED: LESSONS IN FAITH FROM THE USSR
(1983) (documenting the resurrection of religion in the USSR among intelligentsia).
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remain open indefinitely. However, this is not an American (or Brit-
ish) project, despite the origin of the financial support and the nation-
ality of its director (the present author). It is primarily a Russian
project for Russians, with the field-work carried out by experienced
Moscow-based sociologists of religions. For the moment, most of the
material remains in Russian, much unpublished. However, there are
plans to make it systemically available in the original language. We
are seeking ways of making as much as possible available in English.
The picture which is rapidly emerging is one of a vast canvas
stretched out over the length and breadth of the world's largest coun-
try and filled with the most diversified and active elements of religion.
It is a microcosm, no-almost a macrocosm-of world religion on the
threshold of the new millennium. Millions of Russians themselves will
find this study a treasure-trove of new information. Western scholars
of the Russian present, as well as would-be missionaries and those
who wish to offer fraternal aid to the fellow-believers will find this an
essential source.
The new law has not even begun to control the explosion of all reli-
gions, from Russian Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Catholicism, through
Islam and Buddhism to paganism, with more than a sprinkling of new-
age religions and a revival of ancient Russian sects. Nor could it exer-
cise such control, even if the will were there-which it certainly is not
in many of the regions. There have been a number of recent viola-
tions of religious liberty resulting from the passing of the new law, but
overall one would have to classify these as relatively minor irritations
rather than as harbingers of the intention to initiate a nationwide
purge.13
The remainder of this article takes a brief look around the regions
and picks out some dominant trends, but only briefly touches on the
revival of Orthodoxy in the Russian heartland, which is a subject on
its own and which has already been adequately studied by the late
Jane Ellis.14
IV. BUDDHISM
Buddhism was a recognized religion under the Tsars.15 Buryatia,
the Siberian region bordering on Mongolia, had forty-six monasteries
13. Full details of these violations are on file with the Keston Institute.
14. See generally JANE ELLIS, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: TRIUMPHALISM AND DE-
FENSIVENESS (1996) (chronicling the revival of Russian Orthodoxy from its earliest signs to pres-
ent policies).
15. All of these facts, except for the description of the monastery in Buryatia and the death of
Bidiya Dandaron, are taken from the as-yet-unpublished report of the Keston team's expedition
to Kalmykia [hereinafter Kalmykia Field Report].
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and 150 temples before the Revolution. It is not widely known that
Buddhism was also indigenous in one corner of Europe, Kalmykia,
part of the melting-pot of diverse ethnic peoples in the Lower Volga
region, where they had settled in the 17 th century, following migration
from northwest China. From ancient times the Kalmyks had close
links with Tibet and respected the spiritual authority of the Dalai
Lama. The Russians did not interfere in their religious affairs until
the 1 8th century, when they made half-hearted attempts to convert
them to Orthodoxy. Those Kalmyks who did convert had the right to
leave their villages and settle in Russian towns. In the second half of
the 18th century the Tsarist administration abolished the Kalmyk
Khanate and many Buddhists found their way back to their Chinese
homeland. Buddhism continued to exist, but was never as strong
again.
There was a revival of Buddhism at the turn of the 2 0 th century,
following a renewal of ties with Tibet after a visit of the Kalmyk lama
Baaza Maknudzhuev to the Dalai Lama and the holy sites of Lhasa.
Links were also established with Buryatia. The loosening of imperial
controls in 1905 led to a short period of revival and stability, with
ninety-six centers of worship of various kinds in the Astrakhan-
Kalmykia region, with 1,600 recognized Buddhist lamas. Major deci-
sions for further development were taken after the February Revolu-
tion of 1917. However, the subsequent Civil War and the advent of an
atheist regime soon rendered these null and void, despite the estab-
lishment of a Kalmyk Autonomous Republic in 1920. The final flour-
ish was the All-Soviet Buddhist Assembly in Moscow in 1927, at
which the Kalmyks played an important role, but this led directly into
the period of total repression. The final purge of Kalmyk lamas began
in 1931, with the leading figure, Sharal Tepkin, being sentenced to the
camps. Reports from his exile in Kazakhstan indicated that he had
carried out his priestly duties in prison, but he died some twenty years
later without having regained his freedom.
In 1943, Stalin, fearing that the national minorities in Europe might
side with Hitler if the Nazis reached their area, abolished the Kalmyk
Autonomous Republic, and deported the whole nationality to Siberia,
along with many other allegedly-recalcitrant minorities. Those who
survived could return in 1957, the period of the "thaw," and it was
reported that some lamas had been able to continue a secret ministry
in exile. However, there was no permitted registration of any single
religious center or movement right up to the Gorbachev period.
In the interim, however, evidence began to emerge of Kalmyk sur-
vival. In Buryatia this was to a very limited extent permitted, for two
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monasteries were registered at the end of World War II. A leading
Soviet newspaper wrote of this in 1972, describing the Buddhist tem-
ple at Ivolga, just outside Ulan-Ude, the regional capital.
The busy Ulan-Ude to Kyakhta highroad. Crowds of hurrying
pedestrians in the village streets. Hillocks along the roadside.
Everything normal. Suddenly, beyond the snow-covered road,
some curious-looking buildings, glittering in all the colours of the
rainbow. Can it be some sort of mirage? No, it is a Buddhist tem-
ple - a datsan. You push open the gate and find yourself in another
century, in another world. Carved pagodas with marvellously
curved steep-sided roofs, strange sculptured animal, the white struc-
tures of chapels, resembling miniature Indian temples. Silence. The
only sound is the tinkling of the bells under the roofs of the pago-
das, caused by the wind, and a strange scraping sound. We move
closer. An elderly woman is turning the handle of a "holy" prayer
wheel decorated with Tibetan hieroglyphics. She rotates it a full
circle and a bell rings. That means the prayer has been registered
and the sin forgiven. Then her companion, a young girl aged about
ten, moves up to the prayer wheel. She has a lively, smiling face,
and she turns it as though it were some sort of game. She looks
admiringly at the chapels, decorated with the Buddhist and national
Buryat ornamentation. She is obviously attracted by their artistry
.... Then mother and daughter move on to one of the buildings,
where the daily service is taking place. One can hear the monoto-
nous mumbling of the priest - the lama .... In essence, the teachers
have closed their eyes to the problem and refuse to appreciate all its
complexities. In Upper Ivolga children are exposed to particularly
strong religious influence .... Time passes, and the number of be-
lievers in the Buryat Republic decreases very slowly. Its ranks are
constantly being reinforced with older people, who received their
education in Soviet schools .... Buddhism is not as harmless as it
looks. 16
This article, too, was not as harmless as it looked at the time. In
fact, it was a preparation for the arrest of perhaps the greatest figure
of Buddhism in Soviet times, Bidiya Dandaron. He had studied Ori-
ental languages in Leningrad in the 1930s and was twice imprisoned
(1937-1942 and 1947-1954). Dandaron survived to enjoy eighteen years
of freedom (1954-1972), during which time he became active again as
a teacher, translator, writer of articles which circulated in samizdat,
and founder of a secret Tantric sect. This was suppressed in 1972,
Dandaron was arrested, tried from December 18-25, 1972 (less than a
week after publication of the above article), and transferred to
Vydrino prison in Irkutsk. Keston College (as it then was called) first
exposed these events just after the trial, publishing the full samizdat
16. UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA, MOSCOW, 12 December 1972 (translation in 2 RELIGION IN COM-
MUNIST LANDS 40-42 (1973)).
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testimony from Dandaron's friends and supporters. 17 This did not,
however, prevent his death in prison in unknown circumstances a year
later.
Dandaron's influence was perhaps more felt in Europe than in Sibe-
ria. It is clear from this evidence that Buddhism maintained an exist-
ence, part overt, part in secret, during these long years of suppression.
Set against this, it is not such a surprise that there were strong influ-
ences ready to lead to an open revival as soon as this became possible
in the Gorbachev period.
In 1985, a sociological survey reported that already 30% of rural
Kalmyks and 23% in towns called themselves Buddhists. Also, 48%
of families had preserved religious objects and 98% celebrated the
holidays of the Buddhist calendar-these results may be skewed
against religion, because at this time atheist policy was still in full
swing.18
Initially after the collapse of Communism, the Buddhist revival fo-
cused on re-establishing spiritual ties with Tibet. The present Dalai
Lama visited Elista, the capital of Kalmykia, in 1991 and was greeted
with an enormous popular outpouring of enthusiasm. As there were
no local people with a proper Buddhist education, a Kalmyk who had
been educated in American emigration, Telo Tulku Rinpoche, was ap-
pointed as the leader. In 1993, fifteen young Kalmyks went to study at
the Tibetan exile center in northern India and in 1997, five went to
China. Several Tibetan monks came to Elista to teach Buddhism to
the Kalmyks. A Buddhist theological institute opened its doors in
1995. Of the first intake of thirty, only twelve were Kalmyks, the re-
maining eighteen, interestingly enough, were Russians.
However, the Tibetan link fell short of satisfying all the aspirations
of the Kalmyks. Rinpoche left in 1993 for a study period in India, but
he renounced his monastic vows and returned as a married man, sub-
sequently returning to the United States. The Tibetan monks in
Kalmykia do not know the local language and are unfamiliar with lo-
cal problems, as well as having certain theological differences of
opinion.
Two tendencies are replacing Kalmykian allegiance to Tibet. Some
local believers are beginning to look more and more to Japan and
Korea for their education and inspiration. Just as important, however,
are the increasing links with the Buddhist communities of western Eu-
rope. Those who speak for the Kalmyks are beginning to increasingly
17. Id. at 43-47.
18. See GORBACHEV, supra note 2, at 44.
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emphasize their own European identity and underline their role as the
"only European Buddhist country." Bator Elistaev, seen as a leader
of the younger intelligentsia, considers himself a pupil of the Parisian
lama, Deni Eiserinka-Francois. These young people pursue lively per-
sonal contacts, as well as set up daily contact on the Internet.
The President of Kalmykia, Kirsan Iliumzhinov, has now begun to
play an active role as well. He secured financial support, and gave his
warm personal backing, to the building of the Syakiun-Syume temple.
The temple was begun in 1989, but was then given renewed impetus
for completion in 1996. Iliumzhinov is also pledged to establish a
Buddhist university, as well as a publishing base. He presents himself,
the first Buddhist president of Kalmykia, as an active thinker and ide-
ologist, having set out his ideas in a book, Kalmykia - the Soul of the
Earth: the National Idea.19 The field report is worth quoting verbatim
at this point.
In this book Iliumzhinov asserts the existence of a certain "single
flow of soul," which unites paganism, Buddhism, the wisdom of the
epics, and national traditions and customs. But Iliumzhinov does
not limit himself to the popular wisdom of the Kalmyk people
alone; he gives great respect and support to the Russian Orthodox
Church, he has had an audience with the Pope in the Vatican and,
until her death, he used to visit the Bulgarian prophetess, Vanga, to
ask her advice. He not only attends Buddhist services, but also, at
the time of church festivals, Orthodox ones as well. At the begin-
ning of his presidential term, Iliumzhinov put forward a project for
building a cathedral of all religions, although he dropped it when he
became convinced that it was impossible. From 1993-96 the idea of
eclectic ideology of "a single flow of spirituality uniting the reli-
gions of East and West," of a "planetary faith," seemed to be
echoed in the ideology of the Unification Church. Thus the
Moonies were, for a few years, supported by the Kalmyk authorities
and allowed into schools and institutes of higher education. How-
ever, following harsh criticism from the Russian authorities, the
Elista administration withdrew its support, drove the Moonies out
of their schools and cancelled their registration.20
This is in addition to the President's plan of making Elista the chess
capital of the world, but that is another story.
V. PAGANISM
Nowhere is the superficiality of the Soviet eradication of religion
more obvious than with the dramatic re-emergence of paganism in
several areas of Siberia and even European Russia. It has also be-
19. KIRSAN ILIUMZHINOV, KALMYKIA-THE SOUL OF THE EARTH: THE NATIONAL IDEA.
20. Kalmykia Field Report, supra note 15.
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come obvious through the Keston team's research, that the attempted
Tsarist conversion of pagans to Orthodoxy was a failure in many
places.
When the Keston research team was in Yakutia (now renamed as
Sakha), they were told a delightful story of how pagan practices sur-
vived in the Soviet period. The new regime, noting that totem poles
had replaced Orthodox worship as soon as the grip of imperialism re-
laxed, ordered their demolition. The Pagan response was to put a bust
of Lenin on top and continue the libations at the foot of the pole,
which the communist authorities found to be acceptable.
Superstition and all kinds of occult practices replaced religion even
in top circles and evidence of this was legion, especially towards the
end of the communist period. Brezhnev always retained allegiance to
his faith-healers and 99% of Russians believed in UFOs, with the
newspapers feeding them vivid examples.
Even Lenin had a high regard for Nikolai Rerikh (1874-1947), the
philosopher-painter, a convert to Hindu mysticism, and a founder of
his own mystical religion. Rerikh was born in St. Petersburg, but emi-
grated to the United States and thence to India. Encouraged to return
in 1926, he brought with him a file of Himalayan soil to "pour on the
grave of our brother, Mahatma Lenin."'21 I remember, when I was an
exchange student in Moscow in 1959, witnessing the huge success of
an exhibition of Rerikh's paintings. This was at the time when the
renewed atheist campaign was moving into full swing. His sons, Yuri,
who died in 1960, and Nikolai, who died in 1993, promoted their fa-
ther's beliefs throughout their lives. The 1980s and the 1990s saw a
huge growth in Rerikh's popularity again and Keston's field team has
produced a nineteen-page report on this, which contains a detailed
history of this movement up to the present. His philosophy has
brought a Russian influence to bear on the many "new-age" ideas
which have been flooding into the country. Here is an excerpt from
the report:
Under the influence of Rerikh's teaching individuals are emerging
who in their own ways embody his "striving for Unity." In the vil-
lage of Arakchino in the suburbs of Kazan there is an artist and
sculptor, Ildar Khanov. He has for a long time been practising yoga
and his pictures belong to the mystical art of the "cosmic" school.
Khanov has long entertained the idea of building a universal temple
which would unify all religions. Svyatoslav Rerikh approved this
idea and even the sketches of the temple itself, feeling Khanov's
closeness to his father's views .... The most unexpected people




have been giving financial support to this project: businessmen from
South Korea sent a sculpture of the Buddha, while a general of the
Bundeswehr sent a telescope. After completing the building of the
temple, Khanov has been preparing to open a centre of aesthetic
education in it. Children of five or six are to learn yoga, systems of
breathing, drawing and music. Ildar Khanov himself has become
known in the area as an "extra-sensory healer ...." In November
1994 the proceedings of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church appeared, one section of which was entitled, "Pseudo-
Christian sects, neo-paganism and occultism." The conclusion was,
"Paganism, astrology, theosophy and seances (as founded by Yelena
Blavatskaya) have re-appeared .... There is renewed propaganda
for the teaching of 'Living Ethics,' introduced by the Rerikh
family. "22
Whether the Rerikh philosophy should be classified as neo-pagan-
ism or some derivative of Buddhism-Hinduism is a moot point. True
Russian paganism has much deeper roots and has made an astonishing
comeback in the southern Volga area, just north of Buddhist
Kalmykia. The republics of Mordovia, Udmurtia, Chuvashia and
Mari El were all affected to a greater or lesser degree. Their status as
autonomous republics during the Soviet era just allowed them to cling
on to their languages, but put a straight-jacket on any attempt to re-
vive their national identity. When Gorbachev came to power, the re-
moval of this oppression changed the situation dramatically. 23 The
late conversion of these nations to Orthodoxy meant that paganism
survived longer there than it did in the rest of Russia. The worship of
pagan gods in holy groves probably continued up to the communist
period and possibly never totally died out. Also, pagan survivals were
incorporated into Orthodoxy itself. However, there is a concerted at-
tempt to revive paganism emanating almost exclusively from the intel-
ligentsia. For them Russian Orthodoxy is the religion of the
"occupiers" and, as such, became tainted by communism during this
century.
Due to considerations of space, we reproduce here only information
relative to Mari El, but the whole report contains sections on
Mordovia and Chuvashia as well, where the basic features are similar,
but without having reached quite the climactic proportions of Mari El.
The Mari people divide into a christianized minority, but the majority
are now practising pagans.
22. This section is based on a report compiled by the Keston team, before the Pew project
officially began. Sergei Filatov & Aleksandr Shchipkov, Religious Developments Among the
Volga Nations as a Model for the Russian Federation, 23 RELIGION ST. & Soc'v, 233-48 (1995).
23. IZVESTIIA, MOSCOW, 19 January 1998.
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According to a recent survey conducted by Mari sociologists, 5-7%
are "pure" pagans, 60% are of dual faith (a self-designation describ-
ing those who both visit sacred groves and attend church, believing
that in these different ways they are worshipping the same God)
and only 30% are Orthodox believers, mostly Russians. 200,000
Mari live outside their territory, the descendants of fugitives from
christianization, in Bashkiria, Tatarstan and the Urals. Up to 90%
of these are "pure" pagans. Pagan creeds are being reborn in Mari
El in a process of "confluence." On the one hand, practically every
village has a kart (pagan priest), who is a figure of authority and
who preserves pagan traditions from generation to generation. On
the other hand, members of the Mari intelligentsia are moving to-
wards paganism, seeking in it a force to defend the nation against
russification. At the end of the 1980s cultural, social and political
organizations with a pagan ideology arose, and in the 1990s they
took concrete shape in the form of the political organization Kugese
Mlade (Earth of the Ancestors), the culture union Mari Ushem
(Mari Union) and the youth movement U Vi (New Force). The
leaders, motivators and rank-and-file members of the organizations
have been recruited from the artistic intelligentsia and include writ-
ers, artists, leading journalists, folklorists, university lecturers and
professors of Mari language and literature. 24
The Mari are still proud of the way in which they sided with Ivan
the Terrible in the conquest of Kazan in the 1 6th century. It seems that
the folk memory of this battle is livelier than any event connected
with the Revolution or World War II. Every ten years the nation used
to converge on one place-the grave of Chimbulat, a hero of the 1 1 th
century-for an act of universal prayer. The Russians blew up the
grave in 1830, but the meetings continued in other places. The report
continues:
Mari paganism was fully functional right up to the October Revolu-
tion. Most villages still had their pagan priests, and sacred groves
were not cut down (in contrast to Mordovia, Udmurtia and
Chuvashia). Hereditary unbaptized pagans ("pure Mari") consid-
ered themselves upper class, as it were, and would not marry any-
one who had been baptized as a Christian. Before and immediately
after the Revolution conferences took place which brought together
all the pagan priests of the nation. Persecution of paganism intensi-
fied in the 1920s. Priests were repressed and every pagan prayer
ceremony was the occasion for a police investigation. It became the
custom to meet at night to pray. Only once, in 1949, did the Soviet
authorities permit a national prayer meeting, dedicated to the vic-
tory over the Germans in 1945. Tens of thousands of believers gath-
ered and the meeting lasted for more than a week. This event
24. This is taken from the as-yet-unpublished report of the Keston team's expedition to Mari
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
became engraved in the national memory as an important historical
landmark.2 5
The present revival, therefore, was not unexpected. In an effort to
replace the fragile oral traditions, the leaders have begun to systemati-
cally compile a compendium of national traditions, religion, and his-
tory to replace it. The first printed religious text in the history of Mari
paganism appeared in 1992, a collection of prayers for all occasions.
The report continues:
Since their revival in 1991 public prayer meetings have been held
every year and the question of the ritual side of the cult has been
raised. Most of the priests are trying to restore the ancient rites in
their purest form, including the sacrifice of large numbers of ani-
mals. Horses, bulls, sheep and geese are slaughtered in sacred
groves. These are considered the most worthy creatures for sacri-
fice, but for the peasants the practice is ruinous; it also put off town-
speople who have never had to encounter blood in their daily lives
.... [Therefore today are substituted] bread, honey and butter for
the traditional blood sacrifice.26
By contrast, Communist atheist policies caused the Orthodox
Church to lose considerable ground. There were seven churches open
in Yoshkar-Ola, the capital, in 1917, but the last of these closed during
Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign in the early 1960s. This left the
city as the only capital of an autonomous republic in the USSR with-
out a single place of worship. By the mid-1990s, there were thirty-five
parishes functioning in the whole of Mari El (neighboring Chuvashia
has 126). The forty-four clergy seem concerned, the report states, to
focus their ministry on Russians rather than the Mari people.
However, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church cor-
rectly believed that Mari El should have its own separate diocese (it
had previously been attached to Kazan). It also turned out that this
would be the hundredth diocesan see under the administration of the
Moscow Patriarchate (not all within Russia, of course), and as a result,
on July 24, 1993, Patriarch Alexi II arrived in Yoshkar-Ola with due
pomp to inaugurate it. The subsequent events are worth recounting in
some detail.
Just two years earlier, in 1991, Nikandr Popov published his pagan
service book, and in the same year paganism was registered as an offi-
cial religion. The republican parliament also passed a law which,
while officially referring to the natural environment, stated that "reli-
gious cult zones" [i.e. sacred groves] were to come under the protec-
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down or developed in any other way."'2 7 Every village has its sacred
grove, several dedicated to individual purposes, such as healing, ven-
eration of ancestors, or women's gatherings. An actual temple is be-
ing built on a sizeable plot on the outskirts of Yoshkar-Ola, designated
to house an ethnographic museum and a hotel. In 1991 the first Mari
president, Vladislav Zotin, was to be inaugurated. Here is the report
of the event, as recounted by Sergei Filatov and Alexander Shchipkov,
of the Keston team:
The inauguration ceremony took place in the national theatre and
Zotin invited Bishop Anastasi of Kazan to bless his presidency.
However, the pagan lobby in the government intervened in the
preparations for the inauguration and demanded that the unbap-
tized Zotin agree to a pagan blessing alongside the Orthodox one.
So Bishop Anastasi found himself in the theatre auditorium stand-
ing near to the high priest, that passionate champion of pure pagan-
ism, Alexander Yuzykain. The first Mari president was thus blessed
by two faiths, but he was not going to disguise his own Orthodox
sympathies. A year later Zotin was publicly baptized into the Or-
thodox Church and had his flat consecrated. The next day this was
the talk of Yoshkar-Ola .... Several months later Zotin asked Pa-
triarch Alexi to make Mari El a diocese in its own right, independ-
ent of Tatarstan .... Zotin insisted that the new bishop be named
and consecrated in Yoshkar-Ola and not in Moscow, as is often the
case .... The three-day visit was packed with meetings with official
personages: the president, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and
the secretary of state. Everything underlined the social and political
significance of the visit, from reception at the highest level to meet-
ings between the Patriarch and members of the local intelligentsia
and business world. The Patriarch appeared on local television with
greetings to the whole Mari nation. Protocol had no precedent for a
meeting between the Patriarch and the pagan leader, which caused
distress in pagan circles. A senior high priest, Kayimov, dressed in
his priestly robes, tried independently to meet the Patriarch, but he
was stopped by guards. However, the Patriarch did not avoid the
theme of paganism in his speeches. Speaking of the danger emanat-
ing from foreign religious expansion, he stressed that local Ortho-
dox clergy did not want to fight paganism and the "the traditional
faiths and religious organizations of our country must live peace-
fully together and not oppose one another. Some Mari are Chris-
tians and some are pagans. The Russian population here is at root
Orthodox, but the Orthodox will not inspire war and hatred towards
each other in traditional creed."'28
It is interesting to observe, in the light of the new law which would
come into effect four years later, that the Patriarch sounded much
27. Filatov & Shchipkov, supra note 22, at 246.
28. Id. at 247.
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keener to counteract the effect of foreign missions than of the revival
of paganism, a fact which one would have expected to cause him ex-
treme disquiet. The challenge to the Orthodox is clearly to produce
prayer and liturgy in the local language and to seek converts among
the Mari suited to proselytize among their own people. This, how-
ever, is bound to be a slow process; meanwhile, paganism seems
poised to make more rapid headway.
The rise of paganism in Mari El is causing increasing waves in the
political sphere. Pagans from neighboring republics are beginning to
regard Mari El as the model and a kind of inter-republican pagan
political union in the lower Volga region is not beyond the bounds of
possibility.
VI. ISLAM
The rise of Islam on Russian soil is far too large a topic to cover
adequately in this paper. It is a subject clearly destined to greatly in-
crease in importance, especially in the political sense. The disaster in
Chechnya has already ended with the first rupture of unity in the Rus-
sian state. For all intents and purposes, Grozny has won its indepen-
dence, despite the Russian genocide, and President Aslan Maskhadov
has openly declared that his republic operates under Muslim law,
while rejecting the writ of Moscow.
Less well known are other areas where Islam is less solid among the
population, but where, like Buddhism, it has made considerable head-
way in the last few years. An interesting example is the southern re-
public of Adygea on the Black Sea. The Adygs were converted to
Islam in the 1 6 th century, when they came under the influence of the
Ottoman Empire. They then resisted Russian colonization in the 1 8th
and 1 9th centuries. Under pressure, the majority of Adygs emigrated
to Turkey in the 1850s and 1860s, and they became an ethnic minority
in their own land.
In the Soviet period Muslims suffered badly. The last Muslim con-
gress was held in the mountain village of Adamia in 1925. Subse-
quently, every single mosque was closed and all the clergy suppressed.
As a gesture towards the people, however, the Muslims were given an
"autonomous area" within the Krasnoyarsk Territory in 1936.
In June 1991, with great symbolism, the same village hosted the first
congress of Adyg Muslims. They adopted statutes and elected an
aged expert on Islam, Moss Ibrahimovich Chekib, as mufti. He died
three years later and his successor was Said Khuako, who returned to
Adygea after a long exile in Syria, where he, of course, had had op-
portunity to become fully versed in Islam. This is a region where Is-
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lam had virtually died out. However, the changed circumstances of
recent years rapidly began to have an influence.
A major influence in the revival of Islam in the republic has been
the Adyg repatriates, some 500 in numbers, who returned home at
the beginning of the 1990s, descendants of those forced to emigrate
at the time of the Caucasian War. They now play a leading role in
the Islamic community. Not only is the Mufti himself a repatriate,
but so are a number of other imams. Outstanding among them is
Azmet Tashu, a repatriate from Bosnia, imam of the mosque in
Adygeisk, leader of the Muslim youth movement and organizer of
the first medresseh in the republic. 29
What had survived was the "khazbe," a system of rules for personal
behavior and moral norms, which predated Christianity, Islam, and
Communism and held on under each. These rules affected all aspects
of life and bonded the people together: weddings, funerals, family, so-
cial and work relations, the inferior status of women, solidarity with
the clan and relations with other groups. Within the "khazbe" many
relics of magic and the occult survived. Naturally, a purer form of
Islam has come back with the repatriates. What is very significant is
that, while Adygs are a small minority compared with Russians in the
area, they hold political sway.
The Islamic revival is largely supported and directed by the leader-
ship of the Republic of Adygea and personally by its President, As-
Ian Alievich Dzharimov. Despite the fact that Adygs constitute
only 20% of the population (the Russians have approximately
75%), the government has been formed along ethnocratic lines, give
the Adygs control of all major institutions .... The revival of Islam
is central to the politics of consolidation of the Adyg people.
Thanks to the Government's financial assistance and the pressure it
has exerted on business structures to sponsor projects, in the 1991-
1997, nine mosques were build in the villages.., nine are currently
under construction and 22 more are planned. In 1997 work began
on a major mosque in the city of Maikop, with financial support
from Syria. 30
Young people are studying Islam in Syria, Turkey and Egypt. How-
ever, the introduction of Islam as a subject of study at Adygeisk Uni-
versity has not found favor with students. The President has several
times brought the Muslim clergy together in order to urge them to
unify Islamic practices over the whole Adyg people.
By contrast to Adygea, which is on the fringes of Russian territory,
Tatarstan is in the heartland and has sometimes been called the cross-





roads of Europe. The Russian conquest of Kazan was a major stage in
the eastward expansion of the empire. Today the population is
equally Russian and Tatar, with the proportion of Orthodox and Mus-
lims being similar. Both are expanding, but Orthodox is naturally
viewed by many Tatars as the religion of the overlords.
In the early days after the collapse of communism both sectors of
the population made threatening noises.
Between 1990 and 1993 Tataria saw an explosion of nationalist and
separatist feeling, a trend which appeared to differ little from the
processes which were taking place in many other regions of the for-
mer Soviet Union. Thousands of demonstrators turned out onto the
streets of Kazan chanting separatist and antinationalist Slovans.
The Tatar national parties, movements and organizations behind
these demonstrations seemed to be expressing the views of the ma-jority within Tatar society. Russians, not only those living in
Tataria, were well and truly frightened by some of the harshest pro-
nouncements on the lips of the Tatar nationalist leader, the poetess
F. Bairmaova, who wrote: "Children from mixed marriages should
be burnt in the crematorium .... All Kazan's Orthodox churches
are build on the ruins of demolished mosques-these must be
restored. 31
Such threats proved to be idle. Nothing remotely comparable hap-
pened. Rather the reverse. Tatarstan may be seen as one of the areas
in the world where Christian-Islamic relations are better than the av-
erage. That is not to say, however, that these relations are easy, espe-
cially as the region is one which may be taken to illustrate the revival
of Orthodoxy at its most positive.
A potentially explosive problem is the conversion to Orthodox of
Tatars. Orthodox priests usually state that "they are from families
of atheists who had lost their faith." No-one has carried out an offi-
cial count of the numbers involved, but it is clear that it is not a rare
occurrence. There are ten Tatar priests within the diocese and many
Tatar converst can be found in almost every parish. Tatarstan Or-
thodox parish life is rich and diverse. There are well-organized Or-
thodox associations not only in Kazan, but also in some other towns
of the region. One such is the "Three-Saint Brotherhood in
Elabuga and Naberezhnye Chelny," which is involved in publishing,
educational and charitable work. Most exceptional and unique not
only in Kazan, but in the whole of modern Russian Orthodoxy is the
youth group founded by Maria Borisova, who is both a nun and a
highly-qualified chemical scientist. She and her youthful commu-
nity present a picture of healthy Orthodoxy. The work began in
1993 and in 1995 the "Orthodox Youth Community" was registered.
At the beginning parents brought their children to the community
31. This is taken from the as-yet-unpublished report of the Keston team's expedition to
Tartarstan.
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as they would to a club, so they would listen to stories from the
scriptures instead of playing in the street. Later the group grew and
it is now divided into three sections: 100 children, 40 teenagers and
150 adults. There are twice as many young men and boys as there
are girls, which is completely uncharacteristic for the Russian Or-
thodox Church and is a local phenomenon. Every member has
compulsory duties and permanent work within the community.
Idlers are not tolerated. A large number of the members are young
people from technical institutes, many of whom have come into
temporary contact with charismatic churches but have found their
spiritual home here. Activities in the community are varied - educa-
tion programmes, charitable work, pilgrimages, concerts, which
have a special value as a form of missionary work. At Christmas
and Easter there are always big shows written by community mem-
bers and young music groups are invited to participate. At New
Year, to draw the young people away from drinking, there is a com-
pulsory service, which gives this secular festival some spiritual
meaning. At Christmas there is a special party to which students
and young people are invited. Evenings of Christian songs are
amongst the most popular concerts.32
VII. CONCLUSION
It is fitting that we have concluded this arbitrary survey with a few
words about the revival of Russian Orthodoxy, because, despite all
the impressive information about the revival of Buddhism, Paganism
and Islam, it is obvious that the Christian Church is destined to be
visibly and actively present in Russia in a major way through the next
millennium. The failed experiment of state atheism has destroyed so
much, yet what it has left behind proves beyond doubt that human
agency, however systematic its efforts over a long period of time, can-
not eliminate the faith. It also proves that the future of Russia and the
future of Orthodoxy are inseparable. However, this will now be in a
pluralistic society in which the most disparate elements will have to
learn to live together. Laws favoring one group over another threaten
to lead not only to heightened tensions, but to disaster by exacerbat-
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